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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court holds jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rules 3 & 4, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, which were in effect in December, 1987. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Respondents by 
Judge Dennis Draney, Seventh District Court in and for the County of Duchesne, State of 
Utah, on 17th of June 1987. (R. 129-130) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Was the remedy of Summary Judgment, the statute of limitations supposedly having 
passed, appropriate in view of Appellant's contentions below, regarding facts of discovery 
of the cause of action? 
What is the proper statute of limitations in cases involving negligence? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated Title 78, Chapter 12, Section 26(3), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants are related to one another. In June, 1971, by Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, they purchased the parcel of real property comprising thirty (30) acres from 
Strawberry River Estates located in Duchesne County, Utah. The parcel had a "T" 
configuration with 20 acres being situated West of Red Creek and 10 acres East of Red 
Creek. (T 394,431,432) In the fall of 1971, Appellants were contacted by representatives 
of Strawberry River Estates because the "T" shaped property sold to Appellants had left 
two 5 acre plots on each side of the 10 acre section East of Red Creek which could not be 
sold. (T 393) Strawberry River Estates gave Appellants an option to even up the 10 acres 
East of Red Creek to 20 acre parcel, or trade the 30 acre parcel they had purchased for other 
acreage in a different location. Appellants opted to take the two 5 acre parcels and increase 
the total acreage to 40 acres, 20 acres West of Red Creek and 20 acres East cf Red Creek. 
IT 395-397) Appellants received a new Uniform Real Estate Contract from Strawberry 
River Estates with a description that included the additional 10 acres, which contract was 
introduced into evidence as part of Exhibit D -17. IT 398) 
Appellants, having reservations regarding the exact location of the boundaries of the 
40 acre parcel, decided to have the property surveyed. Appellants contacted and hired the 
engineering firm of Wilson & Calder to survey the property. (T 399-400) Appellants, at 
the time they made the initial purchase of the 30 acre parcel, requested and received access 
through adjoining properties to the 20 acre parcel West of Red Creek. Appellants paid 
Strawberry River Estates in full and received a Warranty Deed which included in the 
description of the 40 acre parcel the access road to the 20 acre parcel West of Red Creek. IT 
400-403) 
The 40 acre parcel of property was surveyed by the Respondent, Wilson & Calder. 
Under signature of Glen H. Calder Appellants received a Certificate of Survey dated May 
15, 1972, certifying the location of the property, the dimensions of the property and that 
there were no encroachments on said property. (Exhibit P-I, see exhibit "A") Appellants 
had provided the surveyors with a copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract they received 
from Strawberry River Estates and the description of the 40 acre parcel. The surveyors, 
after completion of the survey, took Appellant, Harry Kreis, to the property and pointed 
out the corner markers and boundaries of the property. IT 413-414) 
Appellants, from the time they acquired the property, used it for recreation and 
camping, planted grass and trees on both sides of Red Creek, repaired the fence along the 
County road and put in fence posts East of Red Creek along the North and South 
boundaries established by the Calder survey to the County road. (T 403-407) On or about 
July 23,1983, Appellants sold the subject property to the Plaintiffs in this action, Robert 
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B. and Karol J. Klinger, by description contained in the Warranty Deed from Strawberry 
River Estates, which description was confirmed by the Certificate of Survey they obtained 
from Calder. Appellants conveyed the property to Klingers by Warranty Deed and received 
in return a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in the amount of $32,000.00. The property 
was sold to Klingers for the asking price of $800.00 per acre, (T. 330). The Klingers had 
made three (3) physical inspections of the property with the aid of a plot map obtained from 
the County Recorder's office and the Calder Survey Certificate of 1972 prior to the 
conveyance. (T 248-250) 
In the early part of 1985, some time in the month of February, the Klingers 
discovered there was a problem with the boundaries of the subject property. They contacted 
Mr. Kightly, one of the Appellants, at his home and informed him that there apparently was 
a mistake with the survey. Mr. Klinger told Mr. Kightly that the Realtor, Mr. Wilkerson, 
would call and explain the whole situation. (T 432- 433). Appellant, Kightly, after 
discussing the problem with the Realtor, Mr. Wilkerson, took immediate action, attempting 
to remedy the situation. Kightly contacted Mr. Conder, who claimed ownership of the 20 
acre parcel West of Red Creek wishing to purchase any interest claimed by Mr. Conder, 
thereby removing the cloud on the title, created by the boundary discrepancies. Appellants 
kept the Klingers informed of their actions and efforts. (T 434-440) 
During this period, the Klingers, without knowledge of Appellants, made 
arrangements to purchase the interest Mr. Conder claimed in the 20 acres West of Red 
Creek. (T. 440) Klingers commenced their action in May, 1986, after they received a 
commitment from Conder to purchase out his interest, claiming fraud and misrepresentation 
on the part of Appellants. One year later, at a Pre-trial hearing, Klingers abandoned their 
fraud claim against Appellants, dismissed the action against the Defendants, United Farm 
Agency and Gerald W. Wilkerson, amended their Complaint alleging mutual mistake, 
seeking rescission of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. 
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After leave of Court, Appellants filed a Third Party Complaint against Wilson & 
Calder and Glen E. Calder individually. Calder filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and 
after Memoranda were submitted to the Court, the Motion for Summary Judgment was 
denied. Respondent, Calder, filed a Motion to Reconsider the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and following the filing of Supplemental Memoranda the District Court, by 
ruling dated June 17,1987, granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
dismissed the Third Party Complaint, ruling that the Third Party claim of the Appellants 
was barred by statute of limitations, basing its granting of the motion on Utah Code Ann. 
$8-12-25(2). (R. 196-197) 
The case was tried to the Court June 23, 1987. The Court, by ruling dated June 24, 
1987, rescinded Klingers Trust Deed and Note for the purchase of the subject real property 
on condition that the Klingersreconvey the real property, free of all encumbrances, and 
restore the property to its original condition. (R. 147 ) The trial Court concluded Klingers 
were entitled to recover the amount of the purchase price they had paid, taxes and interest 
without providing off-set or compensation to Appellants for Respondents use and 
occupancy of the portion of the property conveyed (20 acres East of Red Creek) that was 
not in dispute. Klingers, from the time they discovered and became aware of the boundary 
problem to the time of trial, retained title, possession and control over the 40 acres 
conveyed to them by Appellants. Although Klingers obtained a Deed from Conder to the 20 
acre parcel West of Red Creek (T 382- 384) they did not tender or convey the 40 acres back 
to Appellants (T 302); they stopped making payments to Appellants, primarily due to their 
financial problems in that they made no payments to Conder and were in default on their 
agricultural loan. (T 302-306) The evidence proffered at Pre-trial, May 22, 1987, and at 
trial, was undisputed, establishing the fact that the property sold and conveyed to Klingers 
contained 40 acres. The portion of the property in dispute caused by the defective survey, 
comprised the 20 acre parcel West of Red Creek only. There was no dispute as to the 20 
acre parcel East of Red Creek. Klingers were in agreement with Appellants efforts to 
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remedy and correct the defect, (T 435) but frustrated Appellants efforts and attempts to do 
so. (T. 441) 
At the Pre-trial Conference held in lieu of the scheduled trial, May 22,1987, the 
Court stated that application of equitable principals to this case would result in adjustment 
of the total purchase price for the 20 acre parcel West of Red Creek in that there was no 
dispute to the land sold and conveyed to Klingers comprising the 20 plus acre parcel East 
of Red Creek. The lower Court, after trial, instead of affecting a partial rescission of the 
Trust Deed and Note for the purchase of the 40 acres and adjusting the purchase price, 
concluded that Klingers were entitled to a full rescission of the Trust Deed and Note 
conditioned upon a reconveyance of the 40 acre parcel free and clear of the hen and 
encumbrance placed thereon by Klingers, replacement of fence posts that had been 
removed and restoring the parcel comprising 20 plus acres East of Red Creek to its original 
condition within ninety (90) days of its ruling. (R 146-148) Appellants Motion for New 
Trial, to clarify the Judgment and ruling of the Court (R 173-178) was denied by Minute 
Entry dated November 1,1987 without hearing. (R 198) The Order denying the Motion for 
New Trial was signed and entered on December 3,1987. (R 200) Appellants, by Affidavit 
filed with the Court August 24,1987, placed the Trial Court on notice that the Respondents 
had failed to comply with the ruling of the Court timely in that they had failed to replace the 
fence posts, return the course of Red Creek to its original channel and establish the 
East/West boundaries of Red Creek on the subject property that existed in July, 1983. (R 
189-191) Respondents filed a Counter Affidavit on or about September 3,1987 claiming 
compliance with the Court's ruling. (R 192-194) Notice of Appeal was timely filed 
December 28,1987. 
The parties, with the exception of Respondent's Glen H. Calder, John Doe Wilson 
and Wilson & Calder, have reached a settlement, and the only issues remaining on appeal 
concern the granting below of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. By its own 
admission, Respondent Calder has stated that this case involves negligence exclusively on 
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the part of Calder (See appendix "A", R. 127), Therefore, argument concerning the proper 
staute of limitations to apply is based upon an admission of negligence by Respondent 
Calder. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS RELIANCE UPON THE "DISCOVERY RULE" BELOW RAISED AN 
ISSUE OF FACT THAT COULD NOT PROPERLY BE DISPOSED OF THROUGH SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Appellant's cause of action arose when the negligence in respondent's survey was 
discovered, in January or February of 1985. (see generally 51 Am. Jur. 2d §121, 
Limitations of Actions). The statement concerning the discovery of Respondent's 
negligence is an allegation of fact that requires a trial of its merit and veracity. If in fact, the 
application of the discovery rule is proper under the facts alleged, then the cause of action 
against respondents did not exist prior to its discovery, and the statute of limitations did not 
begin to run until the date of the discovery of the cause of action. If, to the contrary, a trial 
proved that the discovery rule did not apply to the facts as alleged, then a remedy of 
summary judgment would be appropriate, since the factual issues regarding the statute of 
limitations and the discovery of the cause of action would have been properly disposed of. 
To grant summary judgment when the trier of fact has not actually tried issues of material 
fact is improper, and appeal is taken from this premature granting of Respondent's motion. 
The burden of presenting competent evidence, not law alone, establishing the 
propriety of granting a motion for Summary Judgment based upon an argument of a stale 
claim, rests exclusively upon the movant, in this case Respondent Calder. (Staker v. 
Huntington Cleaveland Irr. Co.. 664 P. 2d 1188) The burden of Plaintiff s to produce 
evidence in regard to a motion for summary judgement rises only to the level of evidence 
put on by the movant. (Gadd v. Olson. 685 P. 2d 1041 (Utah 1984)) In order for 
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evidence to be used in support of or in opposition to a motion for Summary Judgment, that 
evidence must admissible under the rules of evidence. Affidavits, for example, are proper 
(Durham v. Margetts. 571 P. 2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Preston v. Lamb. 436 P. 2d 1021 
(Utah 1968)) as are depositions, and verified pleadings. (Union Bank v. Pfeffer. 502 P. 
2d 535 (Ariz App. 1972). 
The court below had received no evidence from Respondent Calder establishing 1) 
that there were no issues of material fact, or 2) that even if all issues of fact had been 
resolved in Appellant's favor, Appellant would fail to maintain a cause of action against 
Respondent. Respondent's answer was not verified. The only remaining items before the 
trier of fact (i.e. had passed the tests supplied by the rules of evidence through a trial as 
such) were not evidence at all, but were in the form of memoranda exclusively. There were 
no affidavits, no testimony of Calder, no depositions, and the only references to the date of 
the survey, its conclusions, and the date of the signing of the certificate were based upon 
memoranda alone. In short, there was no evidence whatsoever supporting the granting of 
Respondent's motion. It was Respondent's burden to produce evidence and it failed to do 
so. Resopndent produce plenty of law, but no facts. The granting of the motion was 
therefore improper. 
The material issues of fact remaining involved the question of 1) the appropriate 
statute of limitations to apply, 2) the applicability of the discovery rule. This Court can 
readily conclude that, based upon the memoranda of Appellant and Respondent Calder, 
there was considerable confusion concerning the applicable statute of limitations on the part 
of not only the parties but also on the part of the court. Without a trial to determine the 
facts of the case, or without at least affidavits and depositions, there could be no motion 
granted based upon a review of the facts. 
Were this court to consider arguments against the application of the discovery rule 
meritorious, relief through summary judgment was still inappropriate. In Christiansen v. 
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Rees, 436 P. 2d 435 (Utah 1968), the Court addressed the appropriateness of summary 
judgment in cases where the discovery rule has been argued applicable: 
[T]he question of whether the plaintiff commenced 
his action within four years after he knew, or should have 
known, (of defendant's alleged negligence) is an issue to be 
resolved by the trier of the facts. (Christiansen at 437, italics 
added) 
Wihout the guidance of fact, the court operated on the basis of pure conjecture in 
granting Respondent's motion. This is improper. If the court is operating without the aid 
of fact when considering a motion for Summary Judgment, then all doubts whatsoever 
must be resolved in favor of Appellant, who acted as the party opposing the motion. 
(Controlled Receivables Inc. v. Harman, 413 P. 2d 807 (Utah 1966); (Foster v. Steed. 432 
P. 2d 60 (Utah 1967)) In granting the moion without and supportive evidence, the court 
below used what has been referred to as a "harsh measure" in such a way that law and 
invented facts were strained in favor of the movant, against the cautions of this Court stated 
in DeVas v. Noble. 369 P. 2d 290 (Utah 1962); Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 656 P. 2d 434. 
The instant case involves a question of whether or not the discovery rule should be 
applied, a determination which must be made at trial, and not via memoranda of law alone, 
or the invention of fact by the court, following presentation of evidence on point. The 
granting of Respondent's motion was therefore improper, as issues of material fact 
remained unresolved which required their trial and examination by the trier of fact. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE DISCOVERY RULE TO THE 
PRESENT CAUSE BASED UPON NEGLIGENCE PURSUANT TO THE RULINGS OF THIS COURT 
The history of the "Discovery Rule" demonstrates that both in legislative and 
judicial contexts, both the breadth and frequency of its application has increased. The rule 
has been extended to cases in conversion in Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P. 2d 
1254 (Utah 1983), wrongful death in Mevers v. McDonald.635 P. 2d 84 (Utah 1981), and 
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medical malpractice in Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P. 2d 435 (Utah 1968), to name but a 
few. 
The discovery rule is especially applicable to cases, such as the present case, which 
are considered "stale" by a strict reading of the statute of limitations but which would result 
in no more prejudice to the Defendant through the hardship of having to produce stale 
evidence than it would to the Plaintiff who has to produce equally stale evidence, and 
where the delay in bringing the action was not the fault of the Plaintiff. Justice Oaks stated 
in Mevers, "Defendant cannot establish that he was prejudiced by having to defend a stale 
claim since his problems of proof occasioned by the delay are no greater than the 
Plaintiffs." (Mevers at 87) Respondents negligently conducted the survey in question thus 
causing Appellant's current hardship. The action was brought by Appellants within about a 
year of the discovery of Respondent's negligence. 
In conjunction with the judicial expansion of the discovery rule, there is a parallel 
legislative expansion. See generally: Utah Code Ann. §78-12-19 concerning recovery of 
an estate sold by an executor of administrator, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(1) for waste or 
trespass by underground works on a mining claim; Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(2) for loss 
of branded livestock; Utah Code Ann. §78-12-6(3) for fraud or mistake; Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-27 actions against corporate stockholders or directors; etc. This legislative 
application of the discovery rule has not been held to bar its judicial application. In Becton 
the Court stated that "Where there are exceptional circumstances that would make 
application of the general rule irrational or unjust this Court has adopted the discovery rule 
by judicial action." (Becton at 1257, emphasis added) In short, this Court has shown a 
clear tendency to broaden the application of the discovery rule both as to the number of 
subjects where the rule is proper and in regard to the frequency with which it has recendy 
been held to apply. 
In the instant case, the rule would be properly applied. The negligent behavior of 
Respondent, if such is proved at trial, has occasioned great loss, damage and expense in 
9 
terms of the time, energy and financial resources of the parties. Injustice would surely be 
worked absent the use of the discovery rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The granting of Respondent's motion for Summary Judgment below was 
prejudicial error. Respondent failed to bear the burden of supporting the motion with 
appropriate evidence and fact. Issues of material fact were unresolved below by the court's 
improper reliance on memoranda alone, and not the presentation of the facts in the course 
of trial, subject to the rules of evidence and the trial of fact. Whether or not Appellant 
knew or should have known of Respondent's alleged negligence is a question of material 
fact which cannot be disposed of by Summary Judgment. 
The discovery rule applies in this case, in accordance with the holdings of this 
Court. Respondent, if negligent, is solely responsible for the litigation resultant from the 
defective survey in question. If the evidence needed to defend or prove negligence on 
Respondent's part is stale, it is stale as per both parties. The memories of both parties have 
had over fourteen years to dim, the documents that both need to produce are equally old. 
Lastly, injustice would result, since Respondent's negligence, if proved, has produced 
loss, damage, costs and expenses to Appellants who properly relied upon Respondent's 
expertise and care as a licensed surveyor, in conducting the survey in question. See 
Price-Orem investment Company v. Rollins, Brown and GunnelL Inc., 713 P. 2d 55 
(Utah 1986) at 59 wherdthe right to rely on representations made by duly licensed party's 
expertise and skill was upheld. 
Appellant prays that this Court reverse the granting of Respondent's motion below, 
to clarify and establish for the court below that at a new trial, Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3), 
together with the discovery rule, is the law which governs any defense based upon the 
running of the statute of limitations. This, together with cost and any other relief the court 
determines proper, is Appellant's prayer for relief. 
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Respectfully submitted and dated this day of November, 1988, 
Ephraim H. Fankhauser 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on this day of November, 1988,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to Robert R Babcock, Attorney for Respondent, at 185 South State 
Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
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APPENDIX A 
Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
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Robert Babcock (0158) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL J. : 
KLINGER, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
UNITED FARM AGENCY, INC. : 
and GERALD W. WILDERSON, : 
Defendants. 
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
RIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS, 
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GLEN E. CALDER and JOHN DOE 
WILSON, individually and 
dba WILSON & CALDER, 
Third Party Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
: OF MOTION FOR 
: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: Civil No. 86 CV 68D 
Fact Summary 
In June of 1971, Third Party Plaintiffs bought a parcel 
of real property in Duchesne County. Glen Calder, on behalf of 
Wilson & Calder, Consulting Engineers and Surveyors, signed a 
survey of the subject real property. 
hlUzL 
/IhDISmiCTCOORTDUCHESf 
JAN 14 198-
R0GERK.MABET7.Uefk 
0U7u 
In July of 1983—eleven years and two months after the 
survey was performed—Third Party Plaintiffs sold the same parcel 
of real property to Plaintiffs. Neither Plaintiffs nor Third 
Party Plaintiffs surveyed the real property in relation to the 
1983 sale of the real property. 
On May 16, 1986, Third Party Plaintiffs filed the Third 
Party Complaint alleging negligence and an improper survey of the 
property. The Third Party Complaint was filed fourteen years 
after Calder signed the survey in question. 
Authority 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25.5 (1953) controls. It 
provides: 
No action to recover damages for any injury to 
property, real or personal, or for any injury to the 
person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising 
out of the defective and unsafe condition of an 
improvement to real property, nor any action for 
damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be 
brought against any person performing or furnishing the 
design, planning, supervision of construction or 
construction of such improvement to real property more 
than seven years after the completion of construction. 
. . . 
A recent Utah Supreme Court case, Hooper Water 
Improvement District v. Reeve, 642 P.2d 745 (Utah 1982), which is 
similar to the case before this court in key respects, dealt with 
section 78-12-25.5 and reiterated that the seven-year statute of 
limitations begins to run on completion of the service. Hooper 
Water, 642 P.2d at 746. 
Discussion 
The first issue is whether a surveyor comes within the 
coverage of the statute. The language of the controlling statute 
0U7G 
is broad. It provides that "no action to recover damages for any 
injury to property" arising out of a defective condition of an 
improvement to real property shall be brought against a person 
"performing or furnishing the design, planning . . . ." 
In Hooper Water, the Utah Supreme Court applied the 
statute to a Consulting Engineer. The Consulting Engineer in 
Hooper Water had directed the digging of a well ten years 
previous to the complaint. The Court stated that the :statute 
bars claims for damage to property caused by any person 
'performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of 
construction o[r] construction of improvements to real 
property.'" Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25.5 
(1953)). A surveyor, then, who also carries the title of 
"Consulting Engineer", fits well within the definition of those 
covered by the statute. 
The second issue is whether the statute of limitations 
has run. This statute is actually a statute of repose, i;n that 
it does not begin to run when the cause of action accrues. 
Rather, it begins to run when upon completion of the service 
performed. Calder, by Third Party Plaintiff's own admission, 
finished the survey May 15, 1972. See Third Party Complaint, p. 
2, and Third Party Plaintiffs' Exhibit A. Thus, in the present 
case, the statute of limitations began to run upon completion of 
the survey. Since the Third Party Complaint was brought May 16, 
1986, a fourteen-year period has passed. This fourteen-year 
period far exceeds the seven-year limitation period mandated by 
the statute. 
0077 
Granting this Motion For Summary Judgment would comply 
with the purpose for which the Legislature enacted section 78-12-
25.5. The Utah Supreme Court explained that the "obvious intent 
[of section 78-12-25.5] was to protect 'persons performing or 
furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or 
construction1 of improvements to real property from indefinite 
future liability." Hooper Water, 642 P.2d at 747 (Howe, J., 
concurring). The governing policy in this area of law, as 
declared by the United States Supreme Court, is that statutes of 
limitations "are designed to promote justice by preventing 
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to 
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and 
witnesses have disappeared." Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. 
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944). 
Precedent from other jurisdictions also supports a 
granting of this Motion for Summary Judgment. For example, 
California has a similar statute of limitations. Cal. Civ. Proc. 
Code Section 337.15 (West 1982). With the exception that it 
provides for a ten-year period, the California statute is almost 
identical to the Utah statute. The California statute also 
specifically includes "surveying." Over thirty other states have 
also enacted similar special statutes of limitations. See Hooper 
Water, 642 P.2d at 747. 
Conclusion 
A surveyor fits within the scope of section 78-12-25.5. 
It is also clear that the seven-year limitation for bringing an 
action has lapsed. We respectfully submit that this Court apply 
007b 
section 78-12-25.5, follow the lead of the Utah Supreme Court 
(which affirmed a dismissal of the action on Motion for Summary 
Judgment in Hooper Water) and grant Summary Judgment in favor of 
Third Party Defendant. 
Respectfully submitted this day of January, 1987. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
By ( t k j MdJ< 
Robert F. Babcock 
Attorneys for Third Party Defendant 
0U7b 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
'ihOlSTRlCTCOORTDUCHESl 
R U L I N G JUfJ 1 ? 1 S S 7 
HOGER K. JViAHtT i, Clerk 
Zy_ 0>
 r:;; 
Civil No. 86-CV-68D 
The Court, having fully considered the pleadings and the 
memoranda, and having now agreed to reconsider Third Party 
Defendant's Motion for Summar Judgment hereby enters its ruling. 
Based upon the pleadings and memoranda of Third Party 
Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the cause of action is one for 
negligence. As such, it must have been commenced within four (4) 
years as set forth in Section 78-12-25(2) UCA. The Court finds 
that the last action necessary to complete the cause of action 
was Calder's signing of the survey which action occurred in May 
of 1972. This action was not commenced until May 1986. The 
Court further rules that the "discovery" requirement of Section 
78-12-26(3) does not apply to a cause of action in negligence. 
Therefore, the Court's previous ruling is set aside and 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROLD 
J. KLINGER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
RIGHTLY, et al., 
Defendants. 
Third Party Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted 
and the Third Party Complaint is dismissed. 
DATED this / 7 ^3ay of June, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
/^ J^W»c^ C>^ . oL&^^X^' 
cc: Rick J. Sutherland 
E. H. Fankhauser 
Robert F. Babcock 
iF-
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APPENDIX C 
Respondent's Second Supplemental Memorandum 
Robert F. Babcock (0158) 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Third 
Party Defendant 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-7000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL J. 
KLINGER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED FARM AGENCY, INC. 
and GERALD W. WILDERSON, 
Defendants. 
EUGENE E. RIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
RIGHTLY, HARRY D. RREIS, 
PEGGY R. RREIS BARNETT, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GLEN E. CALDER and JOHN DOE 
WILSON, individually and 
dba WILSON & CALDER, 
Third Party Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Third Party Defendant, Glen E. Calder, by and 
through his attorney, and submits this Second Supplemental 
Memorandum, incorporating the arguments of its Supplemental 
Memorandum, in^  support of Third Party Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in response to Third Party Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum of Law. 
0122 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM 
Civil No. 86 CV 68D 
WGEHr,MWE7(, t w 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In June 1971, Third Party Plaintiffs bought a parcel of land 
in Duchesne County. Glen Calder signed a survey of the subject 
property in behalf of Wilson & Calder, 
In July 1983, eleven years and two months after the survey 
was performed, Third Party Plaintiffs sold the subject property 
to Plaintiffs. Neither Plaintiffs nor Third Party Plaintiffs 
surveyed the property in relation to the 1983 sale. 
Fourteen years after Calder signed the survey in question, 
May 16, 1986, Third Party Plaintiffs filed the Third Party 
Complaint alleging negligence. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Utah's four year statute of limitation, Utah Code Annot. § 
78-12-25(2), providing that an action for relief not 
otherwise provided for by law is to be brought within four 
years, applies to the negligence case at bar. 
Third Party Plaintiffs' cause of action is grounded in 
negligence. See Third Party Complaint, pp. 3-4; Third Party 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law pp. 3, 4, 6, & 7. That Utah Code 
Annot. § 78-12-25(2) is the appropriate section for a negligence 
action such as this is well-settled, long-standing Utah law. 
Thomas v. Union Pacific R.R.Co., 1 Utah 235, 236 (1875); 
Albretson v. Judd, 709 P.2d 347 (Utah 1985); Matheson v. Pearson, 
619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980); Hansen v. Petrof Trading Co., 527 P.2d 
116 (Utah 1974); Peteler v. Robison, 17 P.2d 244 (Utah 1932). 
Third Party Plaintiffs may not contort and align their 
negligence cause of action to sound in fraud or mistake to avoid 
the applicable statute of limitations. "Neither the form of the 
proceeding nor the name applied to it can change the nature of 
01" ' 
the wrong or the injury . • . the statute fixes the time within 
which such an action must be brought. . . . *" Reese v. 
Qualtrough, 156 P. 955, 959 (Utah 1916). Interestingly, Third 
Party Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law avoids any discussion of Utah 
Code Annot. § 78-12-25(2), which was addressed in Third Party 
Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum at 3-5. 
A cause of action in negligence accrues upon the last event 
necessary to complete the cause of action. Peteler, 17 P.2d at 
249; Beckton Dickinson and Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 
(Utah 1983); See also Lembert v. Gilbert, 312 A.2d 335, 337 
(Del.Ch. 1973) (statute of limitations commenced to run at time 
of surveyor's negligence, not on date plaintiffs became aware of 
negligence). Mere ignorance of a cause of action does not 
prevent the running of the statute of limitations. Meyers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). There were no efforts by 
Third Party Defendant to mislead or persuade Third Party 
Plaintiffs from filing a timely action. All facts were available 
at any time for Third Party Plaintiffs review. Even Utah's 
medical malpractice statute of limitation which incorporates a 
discovery rule prohibits an action beyond four years of the 
alleged negligent act. Utah Code Annot. § 78-14-4(1). 
Third Party Plaintiffs, citing 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of 
Actions, section 121, state that "the cause of action arose when 
the mistake was discovered." See Third Party Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum of Law at 5. First, this is an action for negligence, 
not mistake. Second, the cited Am.Jur.2d section refers to 
injury or damage to real property. The Utah legislature has 
012'* 
designated particular statutes for injury to real property: Utah 
Code Annotated §§ 78-12-26 (three year limitation); 78-12-25.5 
(seven year limitation)(See Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co* 
v. Conklin Associates, 377 A.2d 740 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1977) wherein the court, applying statutory language equivalent 
to the Utah statute, held that surveyors are included in the 
statutory language and ruled for a surveyor in a negligent survey 
action on the statute of limitations issue). 
Pursuant to Third Party Plaintiff's above arguments and 
Supplemental Memorandum, Utah Code Annot. 78-12-25(2) applies to 
and bars the action currently at bar. 
II. Utah Code Annot. 78-12-26(3) for fraud or mistake is 
inapplicable to the negligence action at bar. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3) for fraud or mistake is 
inapplicable to the case at bar. Generally mistake statutes are 
applied in actions to reform deeds and other written instruments. 
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 92, 198. Utah law follows 
this rule. In those cases where Utah Code Annot. § 78-12-26(3) 
was cited for the principle of mistake, it was in a fact 
situation dealing with the reformation of a deed or other similar 
written instrument. Haslem v. Ottosen, 689 P.2d 27 (Utah 1984); 
Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982); Bench v. Pace, 538 
P.2d 180 (Utah 1975); McKellar v McKellar, 458 P.2d 867 (Utah 
1969); Doxey v. Layton, 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976); McKonkie v. 
Hartman, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974). There was no deed or written 
instrument between the parties of this cause of action to reform 
through application of the mistake doctrine. No Utah case 
applies the mistake statute of limitations to a negligence action 
as the case at bar. 
Negligence is not the equivalent of mistake. Mistake 
"assumes to know." Fitzgerald v. Morgan, 38 S.E.2d 171, 173 
(Ga. 1946). "It [mistake] is distinguished from . . . that 
inattention or absence of thought which are inherent in 
negligence . . . mistake has nothing in common with negligence. . 
• •" Callan Court Co. v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 190 
S.E. 831, 854 (Ga. 1937). Mistake is a misunderstanding of the 
truth but without negligence. Id. Negligence results from 
carelessness. Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321, 322 (Utah 
1980). 
The instant case is clearly an action for negligence. Third 
Party Plaintiffs base their action on the alleged "negligence and 
failure of Third Party Defendant to survey and locate the subject 
property." See Third Party Complaint, para. 7. Third Party 
Defendant did not know or understand the truth as to the 
propriety of the alleged negligent survey. In short, there was 
no mistake permitting application of Utah Code Annot. § 78-12-
26(3). Third Party Plaintiffs are currently "statute shopping" 
to avoid the application of the correct statute of limitations, 
Utah Code Annot. § 78-12-25(2). 
The case at bar is also not an action for fraud and 
therefore fails to fall within the ambit of Utah Code Annot. § 
78-12-26(3). Even were fraud alleged, it would be inapplicable. 
Negligence is distinguished form "fraud, fraudulent 
012 , ; 
representations, or. fraudulent concealments, by the absence of 
k i :i o w :i e d g e a n d intentio n, which In legal fraud are actually 
present, and constructive fraud aie I heor P ! I ea J J y presen1 >rts 
necessary elements." Callan, 190 S.E, ai *-S4. 
Irrjud or mi^ taki- as applied In Utah Code Annot. § 78-12-
26(3) is inapplicable to the current action. The applicable 
action for negligence i s U t a h C o d e Anno t,. & 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 ( 2 ) , 
Therefore, Third Pai ty PI ai nti ffs f cause of actioi i ::I s bar reel b^ 
the statute of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
Third Party Plaintiffs' action •»'s for negligence. The 
argument that the mistake or fraud statute applies • simply 
"statute shoppi i lg." ove, n -> i lei ther 
applicable * > this cause ;** action n< r r\as either mistake or 
fc
 --^  •'•»'
>
- leged. Trura Party Plaintiff may not simply allege 
that the case at: bar falls within the fraud or mistake statute 
limitations to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Hall v. 
Fitzgerald, h 1 II1 ,'il " I ,l,!d /!;"/ i ill Hi P U P lll.ih II-1 i i l'w 
Rule 9(b) and 56(e). 
rhi s cause of action in negligence arose over fourteen years 
ago. The statute of 1 imitations for negligence requires that the 
action be brought wi thin four years. This action is barred by 
I f if1 «. 1 ci t u i f,j ill I i in i I a f i tji: i s T h e i e f «re , i f" i s r e s p ^ " * ' <J 1 I y 
requested that Third Party Defendant's Motion for nummary 
Judgment be granted. 
DATED thi s $ day of Ji n le, ] 98' 7. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
012; 
(fyejf fd'.UluJL 
Robert F Babcock 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and" correct copy of 
/ —*7 
1 he f or €iqo I m\ "'.eooiid ""iif i| 11 en ^  ' - * M i th:l s / day of 
June, 1987, postage prepaid * M< i : to E.H Frankhauser, 
Attorney for Third Part^ . -Laintiffs, 660 South 200 East, Suite 
017-7-cald2d.sup 
0126 
APPENDIX D 
Appellant's Memorandum of Law 
15 
E.H. Fankhauser(1032) 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
660 South 200 East Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)534-1143 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DUCHESNE, STATE OF UTAH 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Civil No. 86CV68D 
Judge Davidson 
Defendants. 
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN 
L. KIGHTLY, HARDY D. KREIS, 
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ULhiN H. CALDLR and JOHN Di 
WILSON, individually and d/b/a 
WILSON & CALDER, 
Third Party Defendants. 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and 
KAROL J. KLINGER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EUGENE E KIGHTLY, HELEN 
L. KIGHTLY, HARDY D. KREIS, 
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT, 
UNITED FARM AGENCY, INC. 
r.r.a GERALD \V. WILKERSON. 
FACTS 
Third Party Plaintiffs. Kightly, Krcis and Earnett in July, 1971 
purchased a parcel of real property from Strawberry Estates on a five (5) 
year Uniform Real Estate Contract. The property is located in Duchesne 
County and was purchased by description. Third Party Plaintiffs contracted 
an hired die Third Party Defendant, Wilson & Calder, to survey die subject 
property because of sor , ;. rnm. ;ne ,;^r e\Miii: • •.ndaries. 
Wilson & Calder, under signature of Glen H. Calder, prepared a Certificate 
of Survey dated May 15. 1972, which Certificate stated the following: 
"I, Glen H. Calder, do hereby certify that I 
am a registered surveyor of the State of Utah, and 
that the plat described hereon portrays a survey 
made by me or under my direction. I further 
certify that the above plat correctly shows the true 
dimensions of the property surveyed and of the 
improvements located thereon; and further that 
there are no encroachments on said property." 
A copy of this certificate is on file herein. 
It has been established by Answers to Interrogatories that Glen H. 
Calder, the person who signed the Certificate of Survey, did so without ever 
seeing the subject property, without checking the survey notes and did not 
place corner markers on the property. On or about July 23, 1983, Third 
Party Plaintiffs sold the subject property to the Plaintiffs in this action, 
Robert B. and Karol J. Klinger, by description as contained in the Certificate 
of Survey signed by Calder. Some time in die early part of 1985, Klingers 
discovered a defect in the survey as certified in that Calder had used the 
wrong reference point in conducting the survey and thereby described the 
property incorrectly as it had been described and sold to Klingers. Klingers 
commenced the present action in May of 1986. well within (he three year 
statute of limitations provided for in Utah Code A n. 78-12-26(3). 
Subsection 3 tolls the statute of limitations on actions for mistake and 
negligence until the time of discc.-. c. i said mistake or negligence. Once 
again, the mistake was discovered by Klingers in the early pan of 1985. 
Third Party Defendants were requested to eMablish the locations of the 
boundaries of the subject property. This was there exclusive activity with 
reference to this property. They did not perform and labor or services in the 
design, planning, or supervision of any construction nor did they construct 
any of the improvements on the real property prior to the performance of the 
survey, at any time during the course of tfr - . . • \ • •. ing 
the completion of the survey in May 1972. 
ISSUE 
!n an action for negligence is Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25 applicable for 
~iirtrces of determining when the statute of limitations on the action has ran? 
ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25 is inapplicable to the present case. 
The statute in question provides: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation or 
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; 
also on an open account for goods, wares and 
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store 
account; also on an open account for work, labor or 
services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases 
may be commenced at any time within four years 
after the last charge is made or the last payment is 
received 
shall be commenced within four years. 
The present case against Third Party Defendants involves an action in 
tort, for negligence in the performance of the survey. It does not involve (1) 
an action upon contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an 
instrument of writing; (2) an open acco u : r
 r :i. * wares and 
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store account; (3) or on an open 
account f~r work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished. 
Simply because the code as annotated lists an number of real property actions 
following the paragraph explaining the construction of the statute does not 
force the conclusion that all real actions involving real property at some 
point in the facts are suits in contract or for an open account. As previously 
stated, the present is an action in tort for negligence and therefore Utah Code 
Ann. 73-12-25 has no application. 
ISSUE 
Does Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25.5 apply to the case at bar? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT: Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25.5 defines the limitation of time for actions 
for injury to persons or property. 
The title of this section of the statute reads: "Injury due to defective 
.design oi u< instruction <>l nnpi i>\timinls to lull jwoperty " Again, the 
reference to real property contained in the language of the statute does not 
force the adoption of this section as the appropriate limitation on the timely 
filing of the present action. As pointed out in Third Party Plaintiffs 
memorandum opposing Third Party Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, Third Party Defendants make no claim that the survey of the 
property in question was connected in any way with the design, planning, 
supervision of construction or construction of improvements to the real 
property as expressly required by Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25.5. 
ISSUE 
Does Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3) provide the exclusive statue of limitations 
i.pplk • x 1c to the case at bar? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT: The "discovery rule" is applicable to this case which involves the 
mistake or negligence of Third Party Defendants. 
Third Party Plaintiffs cause of action arose when the mistake was 
ciscovered, in January or February of 1985. (51 Am. Jur. 2d 121, 
limitations of Actions, §121). The duty of a surveyor or civil engineer to 
one who employs them in the course of their profession is essentially the 
same as that owed by any other person who holds himself out to others as 
possessing skill and ability in some special employment and offers their 
services to the public. They must exercise the same degree of care which a 
surveyor or civil engineer or ordinary skill and prudence would exercise 
under similar circumstances and may be held liable for damages sustained 
due to their negligence and lack of skill. Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3) 
provides in part: 
An action for relief on the ground of.. . mistake; 
but the cause of action in such case shall not be 
deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the 
facts constituting the . . . mistake (emphasis added) 
In Mevers . McDonald. 635 P. 2d 84 (Utah, 1985) at S6. ncte 5, the Utah 
Court states: 
[T]he general rule is that a cause of action accrues 
upon the happening of the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action. 
The last event necessary to complete this cause of action was discovery of the 
misiake in the survey made through Third Party Defendant's negligence. 
The question of whether or not this section is applicable is one of fact. The 
three-year limitation did not begin to run, nor could it have began to run 
prior to that time. 
The court must determine the sole question of whether or not Third 
F-ny Plaintiffs knew of or should have known of the facts constituting the 
nvs'ake within the three year time limitation prescribed by the statute. If 
.'hire Party Defendants have objections to the timeliness of the present 
action, they must plead such as an affirmative defense and thereafter they 
bear the burden of proving that Third Party Plaintiffs knew of or should 
have known of the facts constituting the mistake. 
[The] time within which an action to obtain relief 
against mistake or fraud must be commenced is 
within the time fixed by statute, and the time begins 
to run from the time that the aggrieved party 
acquired, or sought to have acquired, knowledge of 
the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
(Weight v.Bailev, 147 P. 2d. 899 (Utah)) 
In De Vas v. Ncble. 369 P. 2d 290 (Utah) the Supreme Court held that 
the statute of limitations was in the nature of an affirmative defense which 
"must be expressly pleaded and proved." Furthermore, Third Party 
Plaintiffs are under no obligation to plead or prove that Utah Code Ann. 78-
12-26(3) is either applicable or not applicable to the present case since that 
burden rests upon Third Party Defendants. Third Party Plaintiffs are under 
no obligation to make a general allegation that they " did not discover the 
[mistake] until until a date within three years of the commencement of the 
action." (Nunnelly v. First Federal Building & Loan Association of Ogden. 
i 54 ?. 2d 620 (Utah) The entire burden of proving that the statute of 
limitations has run rests upon Third Party Defendants. Thus far, they have 
not proved that Third Party Plaintiffs knew of or should have known of the 
facts constituting the mistake more than three years before this action was 
commenced. Therefore, the trial should go forth since Third Party 
Defendants have failed to meet the level of proof required by law. (Third 
i-Lir'.y Defendants cannot prove such thai such knowledge existed three or 
mere y-:ui's prior co the commencement of ibis action by simply pointing to 
another szatute of limitations and asserting that it applies. They must prove 
that Third Party Plaintiffs had notice of the facts constituting the mistake) 
Fairness and equity require that the discovery rule be applied in the 
instant action. Third Party Defendant's negligence has damaged Third Party 
Plaintiffs. They must answer for those damages and cannot hide behind the 
fact that Third Party Plaintiffs were unaware of Third Party Defendant's 
negligence until some fourteen years later. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This case involves suit in torts for negligence. There is no assertion of 
an open account, nor is there reliance upon contract doctrines for relief on 
the part of Third Party Plaintiffs. Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25 is therefore 
inapplicable. The case involves no claim of physical injury to persons or real 
property. Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25.5 is therefore inapplicable. Tnird Party 
Defendants have failed to prove that the statute of limitations has run by 
proving that Third Party Plaintiffs had known or should have known of the 
facts constituting the mistake for which they seek relief more than three years 
prior to the commencement of the present action. Equity and fairness 
require the application of Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3). Neither the court, 
nor Third Party Plaintiffs need prove that a particular statute of limitations 
applies for it is a up to the Third Party Defendants to prove that Third Party 
Plaintiffs action could not be timely given Utah Code Ann. 78-12 et seq. 
Third Party Plaintiffs have made every reasonable effort to bring the instant 
case to bar in a timely manner and have complied fully with the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3). 
TLhd Party Plaintiffs therefore pray that this court grant them the 
i2\'c: sought in the complaint as well as any and ail other relief that the court 
rhcuid Gc-em appropriate in this matter. 
Dated this 19 of May, 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on this /"7 day of May, 1987,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to Robert F. Babcock, Attorney for Third 
Party Defendants, 185 South State, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
